Frans Kaashoek 9156632701 One way of supporting a guard page below kstack: allocate kstacks in ... procinit() and map them high up (below TRAMPOLNE) with an empty mapping below each stack. Never free a kernel stack. Another way would be to allocate and map them dynamically, but then we need to reload page table when switching processes in scheduler() and/or have a kernel pagetable per proc (if we want k->stack to be the same virtual address in each process). One gotcha: kernel addresses are not equal to physical addresses for stack addresses. A stack address must be translated if we need its physical address (e.g., virtio passes a stack address to the disk).		2019-07-19 08:38:51 -04:00
..
bio.c	eliminate ramdisk	2019-06-13 06:57:38 -04:00
buf.h	separate source into kernel/ user/ mkfs/	2019-06-11 09:57:14 -04:00
console.c	FD_DEVICE	2019-06-13 10:29:27 -04:00
date.h	separate source into kernel/ user/ mkfs/	2019-06-11 09:57:14 -04:00
defs.h	One way of supporting a guard page below kstack: allocate kstacks in	2019-07-19 08:38:51 -04:00
elf.h	separate source into kernel/ user/ mkfs/	2019-06-11 09:57:14 -04:00
entry.S	separate source into kernel/ user/ mkfs/	2019-06-11 09:57:14 -04:00
exec.c	Checkpoint switching to per-process locks, in attempt clarify xv6's	2019-07-02 09:14:47 -04:00
fcntl.h	separate source into kernel/ user/ mkfs/	2019-06-11 09:57:14 -04:00
file.c	FD_DEVICE	2019-06-13 10:29:27 -04:00
file.h	FD_DEVICE	2019-06-13 10:29:27 -04:00
fs.c	Checkpoint switching to per-process locks, in attempt clarify xv6's	2019-07-02 09:14:47 -04:00
fs.h	FD_DEVICE	2019-06-13 10:29:27 -04:00
kalloc.c	another test, to help with locking exercises	2019-07-11 05:41:59 -04:00
kernel.ld	virtio disk driver	2019-06-13 06:49:02 -04:00
kernelvec.S	timer interrupt in the kernel -> yield	2019-07-01 13:46:11 -04:00
log.c	separate source into kernel/ user/ mkfs/	2019-06-11 09:57:14 -04:00
main.c	eliminate ramdisk	2019-06-13 06:57:38 -04:00
memlayout.h	One way of supporting a guard page below kstack: allocate kstacks in	2019-07-19 08:38:51 -04:00
param.h	separate source into kernel/ user/ mkfs/	2019-06-11 09:57:14 -04:00
pipe.c	Checkpoint switching to per-process locks, in attempt clarify xv6's	2019-07-02 09:14:47 -04:00
plic.c	clean up virtio code	2019-06-13 09:40:17 -04:00
proc.c	One way of supporting a guard page below kstack: allocate kstacks in	2019-07-19 08:38:51 -04:00
proc.h	document which proc fields are protected by p->lock	2019-07-10 09:28:00 -04:00
ramdisk.c	separate source into kernel/ user/ mkfs/	2019-06-11 09:57:14 -04:00
riscv.h	conservatively call sfence.vma before every satp load.	2019-07-16 17:02:21 -04:00
sleeplock.c	Checkpoint switching to per-process locks, in attempt clarify xv6's	2019-07-02 09:14:47 -04:00
sleeplock.h	separate source into kernel/ user/ mkfs/	2019-06-11 09:57:14 -04:00
spinlock.c	another test, to help with locking exercises	2019-07-11 05:41:59 -04:00
spinlock.h	nits	2019-07-10 14:54:34 -04:00
start.c	separate source into kernel/ user/ mkfs/	2019-06-11 09:57:14 -04:00
stat.h	Make size in stat.h be a uint64	2019-07-04 08:57:23 -04:00
string.c	separate source into kernel/ user/ mkfs/	2019-06-11 09:57:14 -04:00
swtch.S	separate source into kernel/ user/ mkfs/	2019-06-11 09:57:14 -04:00
syscall.c	Merge branch 'riscv' of g.csail.mit.edu:xv6-dev into riscv	2019-07-17 05:53:47 -04:00
syscall.h	separate source into kernel/ user/ mkfs/	2019-06-11 09:57:14 -04:00
sysfile.c	Merge branch 'riscv' into riscv-proc	2019-07-02 14:19:31 -04:00
sysproc.c	Merge branch 'riscv' into riscv-proc	2019-07-02 14:19:31 -04:00
trampoline.S	conservatively call sfence.vma before every satp load.	2019-07-16 17:02:21 -04:00
trap.c	cosmetic changes	2019-07-11 10:38:56 -04:00
types.h	separate source into kernel/ user/ mkfs/	2019-06-11 09:57:14 -04:00
uart.c	Checkpoint switching to per-process locks, in attempt clarify xv6's	2019-07-02 09:14:47 -04:00
virtio.h	Introduce alloc3_desc and UsedArea to make code easier to read	2019-07-01 08:20:35 -04:00
virtio_disk.c	One way of supporting a guard page below kstack: allocate kstacks in	2019-07-19 08:38:51 -04:00
vm.c	One way of supporting a guard page below kstack: allocate kstacks in	2019-07-19 08:38:51 -04:00